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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND HABEAS CORPUS
JAMES B. HADDAD*
This article briefly summarizes important developments reflected in
Seventh Circuit criminal procedure and habeas corpus decisions of the past
year and then treats more extensively a single area of change.' The sum-
mary is necessarily selective. Only a small percentage of published opinions
are discussed. The author emphasizes Seventh Circuit "rules" rather than
cases of national interest. The survey is limited to procedural decisions.
Substantive criminal law issues-the law of crimes and of defenses-are
noted in an appendix. 2  The article is intended to be informational. It
avoids the hopeless task of generalizing about Seventh Circuit philosophy or
directions in criminal cases. 3
The choice of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners as the special
area of concern will surprise some. The bar's lack of participation in these
cases contributed to the problems treated by the court in the author's "main"
case, United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley.4 It also inhibited their solu-
tion. Judge (then Chief Judge) Swygert's call in Williams for more frequent
appointment of counsel for habeas corpus petitioners is adequate justification
for the extensive discussion of this area.
Both parts of the article reflect the author's parochial preferences for
the state-court procedures with which he is most familiar. Thus he is quick
to criticize federal practice where it varies from Illinois law and sensitive to
federal criticism of state procedures. The author's only "defense" for his bias
is that he has genuine respect for the Supreme Court of Illinois and (as to
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; member of Illinois Bar; J.D.,
LL.M., Northwestern University.
1. Cases discussed in this article were decided within the one year period ending
August 15, 1975.
2. An understanding of factual situations too complex to be treated is necessary
to a discussion of many of the Seventh Circuit's interpretations of important federal
penal statutes. Additionally, opinions announced after the author's cut-off date of Au-
gust 15, 1975, would have to be treated in any meaningful discussion of the Circuit's
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (mail fraud). See United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975).
3. Generalizations about "the court" are almost meaningless because so many
senior district and circuit judges, from various parts of the country, sit in the Seventh
Circuit. Some of last year's reviewers made this same point. See Eglit, Fritzsche, &
Muller, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 337, n.1 (1974) and ac-
companying text.
4. 502 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1974).
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the second part of this article) high regard for that court's efforts to provide
fair and orderly post-conviction procedures.
No doubt the Seventh Circuit's harsh words in Williams for the Supreme
Court of Illinois inspired the section dealing with the issue of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners. Many words appear in that section in response
to the advice which the Seventh Circuit, "[w]ithout meaning to be gratui-
tous," 5 gave to the Illinois high court. Nevertheless this article pays deserved
tribute to the Seventh Circuit's efforts in Williams to get its own post-convic-
tion house in order.
A GENERAL SUMMARY
Police Practices and Exclusionary Principles
Eye-Witness Identification
The utilization of jury instructions and the invocation of exclusionary
principles are contrasting methods designed to decrease the possibility of con-
victing the innocent through faulty eye-witness identification.6 This past year
the Seventh Circuit gave increased emphasis to the jury-instruction alterna-
tive and limited the importance of the exclusionary rule promulgated in
Stovall v. Denno.7
In United States v. Hodgess the circuit adopted as a required practice
the giving of a detailed jury instruction as to eye-witness identification, at
least where identity is a crucial issue and the defense has made the request.
The court strongly suggested that the instruction must be the substantial equi-
valent of one adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Telfaire.9
The Hodges rule represents an exercise of supervisory powers. Dictum
in an earlier decision says that no identification instruction is constitutionally
mandated. 10 This is an important distinction, particularly in habeas corpus
cases arising in Illinois, where the state rule of law is that ordinarily no
detailed instruction concerning eye-witness identification should be given."
5. Id. at 1387.
6. See generally Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safe-
guards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MicH. L. REv. 717,
790-97 (1974).
7. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
8. 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The lengthy instruction is set forth in an
appendix to Telfaire. 469 F.2d at 558-59.
10. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 408 n.34 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 2424 (1975).
11. With respect to the circumstances of identification, Illinois Pattern Jury In-
struction (Criminal) 3.15 recommends that no special instruction be given. See also
People v. Hope, 22 Ill. App. 3d 721, 318 N.E.2d 128 (1974).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Most courts have concluded that where police practices are unneces-
sarily suggestive in violation of the principles of Stovall, proof of the out-of-
court identification is per se inadmissible, if the defense wishes, with the in-
court identification admissible only if the prosecution can demonstrate
independent origins.' 2 The Stovall opinion did not expressly say this. That
decision did not even indicate whether it was considering the out-of-court
identification or the in-court identification or both. Nevertheless the two-
step model of United States v. Wade'3 and Gilbert v. California,14 designed
to remedy violations of the right-to-counsel at corporeal identification proce-
dures, has been borrowed where the Stovall due process right has been
violated.
In very thoughtful and highly sophisticated opinions, the Seventh
Circuit this past year rejected a per se rule of exclusion, even as to out-of-
court identifications, in cases where law enforcement officials have utilized
unnecessarily suggestive procedures. 15 Largely ignoring the gloss placed
upon Stovall by other state and federal reviewing courts, and concentrating
on the language of Stovall and subsequent United States Supreme Court
opinions, the Seventh Circuit has held that the constitutional right recognized
in Stovall is violated only where, following unnecessarily suggestive police
practices, identification evidence which is in fact unreliable is admitted at
trial. 16 If there is no doubt about the reliability of an identification, despite
grossly suggestive and unnecessary police procedures, even proof of the out-
of-court identification may be admitted. Stated more theoretically, the sus-
pect has no right to the utilization of fair procedures but only a right not
to be convicted on the basis of an unreliable identification caused by unnec-
essarily suggestive police procedures.' 7 A per se rule of exclusion will not
be adopted in the hope of deterring unfair police procedures.' 8
Each of the opinions in which the court reached this result arose from
a state prosecution, leaving open the possibility that the Seventh Circuit might
adopt a per se supervisory rule of exclusion, at least as to out-of-court identi-
fications, in federal prosecutions where law enforcement officials have used
unnecessarily suggestive procedures. Assuming this power exists,' 9 at least
12. People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill. 2d 508, 250 N.E.2d 152 (1969), typifies deci-
sions which effortlessly import the Wade-Gilbert two-stage reasoning into the Stovall sit-
uation.
13. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
14. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
15. The key decision is United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2424 (1975). Also important is United States ex rel.
Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1974). Principles announced in those deci-
sions were applied in Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1975).
16. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d at 406.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 408.
19. To the extent that the Constitution does not mandate an exclusionary rule,
Congress may have precluded a court's exercise of supervisory powers, at least as to in-
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one panel of the court seemed disinclined to adopt such a rule.20
Statements, Admissions, and Confessions
In United States v. Oliver2 1 the Seventh Circuit adhered to the minority
position it had espoused in United States v. Dickerson:2 2  Internal Revenue
Service Intelligence Division agents must give the Miranda warning to sus-
pects before non-custodial interrogation. In a tax case, the court says, the
transfer of an investigation to the Intelligence Division marks the citizen as
the focus of a criminal investigation. Nevertheless the Seventh Circuit con-
tinues to insist that in other situations "focus" will not suffice to trigger
Miranda rights.23 In a case arising from another circuit, the Supreme Court
in the October, 1975, Term, even if it does not resolve the focus-custody
debate, may well pass judgment upon the soundness of the Dickerson-Oliver
line of decisions.
24
The other major Seventh Circuit confession decisions condemned police
practices of more than a decade ago. 25 The opinions are anachronisms which
court identification, by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3502, which provides that a witness may
testify that he saw the accused commit or participate in the commission of a crime. For
a discussion of an analogous question, see United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378 (3rd
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1123 (1975). Additionally, after July 1, 1975, all
relevant evidence, subject to certain exceptions not here applicable, is admissible in
United States courts under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. Perhaps this rule will be read
to prohibit circuits from excluding evidence in the exercise of their supervisory powers.
20. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d at 407-08.
21. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
22. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
23. See United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1268 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1975).
24. United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422
U.S. 1006 (1975). The focus-custody dispute arose from a curious note in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, n.4 (1966), stating that custody is what the Court meant
when it used the term focus in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See United
States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970) for an
excellent discussion of this issue.
25. In addition to the case mentioned in the text, another case in the same cate-
gory is United States ex rel. Adams v. Bensinger, 507 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). The court granted relief to an individual of subnormal
mental capacity, relying heavily on I.Q. tests and a psychologist's opinion that Adams,
when he confessed in 1962, was extremely docile. Although the decision is based upon
the old voluntariness, totality-of-the-circumstances test, perhaps the type of evidence re-
lied upon could be utilized in litigating the voluntary nature of a suspect's waiver of Mir-
anda rights.
Adams is a sad case. The Seventh Circuit delayed decision on the merits of peti-
tioner's claim for seven years while the federal courts debated whether Adams had raised
the voluntariness issue in the state supreme court. The court suggested that this question
was relevant to the issue of whether Adams still had an available state remedy. In fact,
the question was wholly irrelevant. Whether raised on appeal or not, that issue would
not be considered in any further state proceeding, being barred either by res judicata
or by waiver. See note 147 and accompanying text. According to counsel for Adams,
the state post-conviction judge who considered the issue (only to be told by the Supreme
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will have little effect on future prosecutions. One is worth mentioning
because it is unique. In United States ex rel. Mattox v. Scott,26 the court
remanded for a determination of whether "Escobedo warnings" were given
preceding questioning at a time when Escobedo, but not Miranda com-
pliance was necessary. 27  The per curiam opinion creating the concept of
Escobedo warnings ignores a long line of cases approved by the United States
Supreme Court. Those cases hold that Escobedo applies only where the sus-
pect requested counsel and does not require admonitions. 28 The Mattox
opinion gave the district court no guidance as to what constitutes adequate
Escobedo warnings.29
Arrest, Search, and Seizure
A few of the year's fifteen or so published Seventh Circuit search and
seizure opinions treat routine questions. Two, for instance, discuss whether
the facts before the district court demonstrated sufficient governmental
involvement in searches conducted by private citizens to require application
of the exclusionary ruleA0 Most of the published opinions, however, are of
substantial intellectual interest. Many reflect a high degree of expertise and
a grasp of subtle principles.
The decisions show an increasing awareness of Professor LaFave's
question, "Probable cause as to what?"3 1  The opinions also reflect an
Court of Illinois that he should not have) did so because he was embarrassed by the
judicial run-around Adams had received from the federal courts. Adams was paroled
shortly before the Seventh Circuit reached the merits of his claim.
26. 507 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1974).
27. The original trial came between the date of the Escobedo decision and the date
of the Miranda decision. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
28. Before the Miranda decision very few jurisdictions had read Escobedo to re-
quire certain warnings. See, e.g., People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
398 P.2d 361 (1965). However, after the Supreme Court held that Escobedo applied
to cases tried after the Escobedo decision and that Miranda applied to cases tried after
the Miranda decision (see note 27 supra), the restrictive reading of Escobedo seemed
to be the correct one. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the United States Su-
preme Court expressly held that Escobedo was not violated absent a clear request for
counsel.
29. The opinion directed a determination of whether "petitioner was properly ad-
vised of his Escobedo rights." 507 F.2d at 921. The district court on remand denied
relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed and vacated the state conviction. Mattox v. Fink-
beiner, 519 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1975). Its memorandum opinion will remain unpub-
lished and cannot be cited as authority. See Seventh Circuit Rule 28. This decision
interprets the first Mattox decision as holding that in a post-Escobedo, pre-Miranda case,
a suspect's reference to a desire to see counsel gave rise to the obligation to warn the
suspect of his right to remain silent, even where authorities did nothing to prevent the
suspect from contacting a lawyer. This narrow interpretation is more respectable than
anything appearing on the face of the first Mattox decision.
30. United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Is-
sod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975).
31. LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . . . Has Not
Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 260.
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answer in accord with the present author's suggestion that probable cause is of
four types: crime, offender, search, and seizure.3 2
The Seventh Circuit decisions pay heed to search probable cause and
seizure probable cause issues which some defense lawyers overlook in their
concentration upon crime probable cause or offender probable cause. Thus
in United States v. DiNovo33 Judge Swygert noted "the difficult question of
whether the mere fact that an individual is selling drugs and has possession
of a large quantity of drugs someplace is sufficient cause to search his resi-
dence."'3 4 In an extortion case where money had been obtained Judge Pen
considered the broader search probable cause issue of the "quantum of infor-
mation needed to search a suspect's house after he has been linked to a
crime," as well as what constitutes probable cause to search a criminal's car.8 5
Because of more specific information suggesting in each case that a search
would prove fruitful, the court approved the issuance of warrants in both
cases. Neither opinion found it necessary to treat the broad issues which the
court suggests will undoubtedly arise in future cases.
United States v. Jones36 is, in the author's terminology, a seizure prob-
able cause decision. On July 10, 1973, Chicago police officers executed a
valid warrant which directed the seizure of heroin and narcotics parapher-
nalia. Probable cause for the issuance of the warrant was based on a July 2,
1973, $2,500 controlled purchase of narcotics at the apartment to be
searched and also upon more recent narcotic transactions elsewhere. The
police seized $2,000, even though money was not an item named in the war-
32. This four-fold analysis of probable cause is developed in Haddad and Zagel,
Arrest Search and Seizure, 1975 Manual, Northwestern University Short Course for
Prosecuting Attorneys 5-12.
Crime probable cause refers to the probability that an offense has been committed.
It is necessary for arrest and for the issuance of a search warrant but not, for instance,
for plain view observations or a consent search.
Offender probable cause refers to the probability that a particular individual has
committed an offense. It is necessary for arrest but not, for instance, for the issuance
of a search warrant. See, e.g., People v. Daugherty, 324 II. 160, 154 N.E. 907 (1927);
People v. Simmons, 330 Ill. 494, 161 N.E. 716 (1928).
Search probable cause refers to the probability that a search will prove fruitful. It
is necessary for the issuance of a search warrant but not, for instance, for the conduct-
ing of a consent search nor for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Seizure probable cause refers to the probability that an item constitutes evidence
of an offense. It is a requirement for the taking and carrying away of a citizen's prop-
erty even where the property has been observed in plain view or even where (absent
a broadly worded authorization) consent to search has been granted. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Hawkins, 280 N.E.2d 665 (Mass. 1972). It is not a requirement, for in-
stance, for certain administrative seizures, such as the taking of a prisoner's street clothes
before he enters a cell.
33. 523 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1975).
34. Id. at 200-01.
35. United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. 518 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1975).
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rant and even though at the time of the seizure, the police did not know
whether the money was part of the cash used in the controlled purchases.
Judge Sprecher's majority opinion noted that observations of the money
during execution of the warrant were justified on plain view principles. The
opinion also recognized, however, that the inquiry must go further. It must
be determined whether there was seizure probable cause, that is, whether,
at the time of the seizure, the officers had reason to believe that the cash
was evidence of a crime. On the particular facts, over Judge Swygert's
dissent, the majority found seizure probable cause.
The Jones dissent demonstrates the narrow path the prosecution must
follow to justify a warrant officer's plain view seizure of items not named in
the warrant. On the one hand, if, at the time of the issuance of the warrant,
officers already had probable cause to believe that the item was at the place
to be searched, the Coolige v. New Hampshire3 7 requirement of "inadver-
tence" might preclude invocation of the plain view doctrine. On the other
hand, if, at the time of the seizure, there still was not probable cause to
believe that the plain view item constituted evidence of a crime, for want
of seizure probable cause, the seizure of that item was unlawful.
United States v. Lisk3s is a prime example of highly sophisticated fourth
amendment reasoning. Judge Stevens resolved a standing question in a
fashion which, to the author's knowledge, is without precedent. Yet his bril-
liant opinion logically follows from basic principles.
To acquire standing Lisk alleged a possessory interest in a bomb which
had been found in an illegal search of the trunk of Hunt's car at a time when
Lisk was not present. 39 The court held that the search did not violate Lisk's
rights. It further held that the seizure was lawful as to anyone whose rights
had not already been violated before authorities observed the contents of the
trunk.
Phrased another way, even if he had a possessory interest in the item
seized, Lisk had standing to contest only the seizure of his property and not
the search of someone else's car. The seizure could be justified on normal
plain view principles. Only those whose rights had been violated before the
37. 403 U.S. 433, 469 (1971). Only four justices acknowledged an "inadvertence"
requirement for plain view seizures. Accordingly, some courts refuse to recognize such
an exception. See North v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 301, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d
1305 (1972).
38. 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. Perhaps cases similar to Lisk are unusual because rarely will the accused allege
an interest in property found in another's control. Even if his allegations on the motion
cannot be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief, Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), in many jurisdictions the use of such allegations for impeachment pur-
poses has been approved. See, e.g., Woody v. United States, 379 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir.
1967); People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974). Thus a defendant
who is considering testifying at his own trial may choose not to make admissions on
the motion.
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observations were made could complain that the officers were not in a place
where they had a right to be at the time of their observations. The seizure
was unlawful only because the search was unlawful, so that one without
standing as to the search could not complain that the seizure was unlawful
as to him.
At least at the trial level, the prosecutor had not suggested this thought-
ful analysis of the issue. Instead he had stipulated that both the search and
the seizure were illegal. 40
Those who practice criminal law in district courts within the Seventh
Circuit should review other important recent fourth amendment opinions. 41
A reading of the decisions discussed above will suffice, however, to demon-
strate that the attorney who comes before the Seventh Circuit feeling a need
to educate the court on the finer points of the fourth amendment may him-
self or herself receive some advanced learning.
Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping
Practically every circuit has considered routine wiretapping and eaves-
dropping issues similar to those treated by the Seventh Circuit during this
past year. 42 Although the opinions of our circuit offer nothing new or sur-
prising, the author, departing from case selection criteria used elsewhere in
this article, notes one decision which simply follows prior Seventh Circuit
precedent. He believes that the question of alleged violations by federal
officials of state eavesdropping statutes deserves more attention than it has
received.
Ever since the Illinois Supreme Court's "surprising" opinion in People
v. Kurth43 (over the dissents of Justices Schaefer and Underwood), federal
authorities overhearing and recording conversations with the consent of one
party have been out of compliance with Illinois law.44 The Seventh Circuit
40. The court did not consider itself bound by the legal conclusion contained in
the stipulation. 522 F.2d at 231.
41. Important decisions include United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41 (7th Cir.
1975) (search incident to arrest; thoughtful discussion of significance of arrest's being
"unlawful" under state law); United States v. Davis, 514 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1975)
(stop-and-frisk). United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1975), contains an
important discussion of the reliability of various types of informants for purposes of es-
tablishing probable cause.
42. See United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Quintana, 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975).
43. 34 IIl. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966). Justice Klingbiel's interpretation of
the Illinois statute, discussed infra note 44, was called a surprise by the court in People
v. Rhodes, 71 Ill. App. 150, 217 N.E.2d 123 (1966). Based on past precedents, Justice
Samuel 0. Smith asserted that to have anticipated such an interpretation a lawyer would
have needed not legal "competency" but instead "divination." 71 IlI. App. 2d at 152,
217 N.E.2d at 125.
44. Kurth interpreted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2(a) (1963), to prohibit elec-
tronic overhearing or recording of anyone's conversations without that person's consent.
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has avoided resolution of the troublesome question of whether federal
authorities must comply. As in United States v. Infelice,45 decided this past
year, the court has done so by noting that the admissibility of evidence in
federal court is a federal question.46  Of course it is. But neither Infelice
nor its predecessors reflect much thought as to how the question should be
answered.
Mr. Justice Holmes, one of four dissenters in Olmsted v. United States,47
declared that federal courts should not admit the fruits of governmental con-
duct performed in violation of state penal laws. 48 Mr. Justice Brandeis
agreed. 49  In many other contexts, the Olmsted views of Holmes and
Brandeis are now thought to be the law of the land. 50 At the very minimum,
those views deserve serious attention.
In whatever fashion the court resolves the admissibility issue, the circuit
would be doing all concerned a favor if it decided the question of whether
federal authorities are, in fact, bound by restrictive state eavesdropping stat-
utes. A well considered dictum would be appropriate. Eventually in civil
or criminal litigation, with federal authorities as defendants, the circuit will
have to face the issue.51 If federal authorities are wrong in their interpreta-
tion of the law, they should be told so as soon as possible. 52
A 1969 statutory amendment permitted such overhearing and recording with the consent
of one party to the conversation and a state's attorney. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §
14-2(a) (1973). Before the amendment federal authorities refused to comply with Illi-
nois law, as interpreted in Kurth. After the amendment, federal authorities generally
did not seek the consent of local prosecutors that is required for compliance with § 14-2.
45. 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
46. 506 F.2d at 1365. See also United States v. Pullings, 321 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1963); Magee v. Williams, 329 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Martin, 372
F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971); United States v. Krol, 374 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1967).
47. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
48. Id. at 469-471 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 479-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 659 (1961) (Brandeis' denunciation of Government as a lawbreaker cited to sup-
port exclusionary rule). If exclusion of evidence secured through violation of state
penal law is not constitutionally mandated, then Federal Rule of Evidence 402 might
pose an additional barrier to a circuit's adopting a supervisory rule of exclusion. See
note 19 supra.
51. Illinois law provides a civil remedy for the violation of its eavesdropping stat-
ute by law enforcement officers and others. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-6 (1973). The
possibility of a local prosecutor indicting a federal law enforcement officer is real. In
a jurisdiction within a different circuit, a dispute, perhaps in part political, very nearly
led to a local prosecutor's indicting federal officials under a restrictive state eavesdrop-
ping statute. Presumably such a state prosecution would be removed to federal court,
as would any civil suit, leaving the ultimate decision to the United States courts.
52. The federal argument largely rests upon the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2) (c) (1970) makes one-party consents lawful. One federal decision reads this statute
literally and concludes that the statute merely means that under that act electronic eaves-
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Limitations Upon Exclusionary Rules: The Boundaries of
Derivative Evidence Principles, and Collateral Use of
Illegally Obtained Evidence
When a defense lawyer argues that evidence should be excluded as the
fruit of police illegality, occasionally a prosecutor will try to invoke doctrines
with names like "attenuation" or "dissipation," "independent origin," or
"inevitably discoverable." United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey 53 is
required reading for all who wish to understand these principles. Clearly and
concisely Judge Hasting's opinion defines these doctrines and their bound-
aries, while rejecting the claim that a particular identification should have
been excluded as the product of illegal seizures of a photograph and an
address book.
Another limitation upon exclusionary principles permits utilization of
unlawfully obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. In United States
v. Tweed,54 the Seventh Circuit permitted the Government to use illegally
seized evidence to contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examina-
tion. Following Harris v. New York, 55 Tweed went a step beyond the older
search case of Walder v. United States.5 6 Walder permitted use of illegally
obtained evidence to impeach as to a collateral issue which the defendant
had injected into the case. In Tweed, as in Harris, the court permitted
impeachment of defendant's testimony on a matter directly in issue.
Finally, United States v. Johnson57 places limits upon inferences which
defense counsel can draw from the absence of evidence which the trial court
has suppressed. Before trial a witness in Jones had made a photographic
identification, which later was suppressed. She had failed to make an iden-
tification at a lineup; thus defense counsel made no motion as to the lineup
procedures. At trial, following questioning concerning the lineup, counsel
concluded by asking the witness whether it was her testimony that she had
been unable to identify the defendant. The witness said that this was true.
Judge Pell's opinion for the court read this testimony to suggest the
inference that the witness had never made an identification. Accordingly,
the court sanctioned the prosecution's pursuit of the truth on re-direct exam-
ination, despite the suppression order.
dropping with one-party consent is not unlawful. United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). If no federal statute affirmatively
authorizes such overhearing, then under much older decisions, federal law enforcement
powers might well be limited by state law. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15, n.5 (1948). Even the Olmsted majority left open the issue of state prosecution of
federal officials for violation of restrictive state statutes. 277 U.S. at 469.
53. 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. 503 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
56. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
57. 502 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975).
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Defense lawyers frequently suggest and argue inferences which they
know are untrue where deficiencies in the prosecution's case make such sug-
gestions plausible. Judge Pell seems to be saying that where the deficiency
of proof arises from a suppression order, the tactic is unfair and opens the
door to prosecution response. 58 The moral is that defense lawyers who have
won suppression motions dare not exploit their victories too fully.
Pre-Trial, Trial, and Sentencing Proceedings
Discovery and Disclosure
The Seventh Circuit's important criminal discovery decisions of this past
year (apart from Jencks Act decisions of special applicability to tax cases 59)
must be considered in light of subsequent amendments to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16.60
In United States v. Jackson,61 the Seventh Circuit for the first time held
that a trial judge has discretion to require the prosecution to supply the de-
fense with a list of witnesses before trial. All but a few states provide the
defendant with such a list as a matter of right.62 Thus many practitioners
viewed Jackson as a long overdue step in taking federal criminal discovery
into the modern era.
The issue of the future, however, is whether Jackson will survive past
December 1, 1975, when amendments to rule 16 take effect. It is true that
rule 16 as it read when Jackson was decided no more expressly provided for
a list of witnesses then does the newest version. Now, however, because the
Senate-House Conference Committee recommendations were accepted, and
all references to a list of witnesses were expressly deleted from the final ver-
sion of rule 16 amendments, a stronger statutory argument can be made
against the right of a court to order the Government to provide such a list.
58. Of course, frequently the inference will not be drawn until closing arguments.
Whether the prosecution can respond in that situation simply by declaring "the truth"
is a different question because then the prosecutor would be commenting on matters not
in evidence. See United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1975). Perhaps
on rare occasions unfair comment may justify re-opening of the evidence.
59. See United States v. Krilich, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Cleveland, 507 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1974). Both deci-
sions concern access to the special agent's report in a net worth case. Krilich was
treated in last year's review, as was United States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1973) (Cleveland I), to which Cleveland II is an important sequel. See Ettinger, Crim-
inal Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 465, 493-94 (1974).
60. President Ford signed H.R. 6799 on July 31, 1975. That bill deleted proposed
rule 16A(1) (e) entirely, so that the list-of-witnesses provision, scheduled to become ef-
fective August 1, 1975, does not appear in the final version of rule 16. Rule 16, as
amended, became effective on December 1, 1975. 17 CRIM. L. RPT. 3215-18 (1975).
61. 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975).
62. See Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971
U. ILL. L.F. 557, 600-50.
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Apparently, it now is national policy to deny the accused knowledge, in
advance of trial, of the witnesses against him. 63
If Congress intended to forbid a judge from ever ordering a list of
witnesses, it may have created a serious sixth amendment question. In
United States v. Krilich,64 a recent Jencks Act decision, the Seventh Circuit
related the purpose of discovery (in that case, mid-trial discovery) to the
right to confront witnesses. This is a fitting analysis, even though it has
rarely been used as a basis for devolping the law of criminal discovery.
Considering the denial of mid-trial discovery (the true name of a wit-
ness), the Supreme Court in Smith v. llinois65 in 1968 declared: "The
witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination
and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at
the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination it-
self."66
In the real world where efficient administration is a valued goal, mid-
trial continuances are almost never granted. Accordingly, the kind of out-
of-court investigation contemplated by the Smith decision is impossible absent
a list of witnesses before trial.
Thus the Jackson-rule 16 issue facing the Seventh Circuit after Decem-
ber 1, 1975, must be decided against a sixth amendment background, just
as was the Jencks Act question in the Krilich67 decision this past year.
The Government's major criminal discovery victory this year was United
States v. Feinberg.68 There the court held that a trial judge cannot require
the Government to disclose in advance of trial the substance of oral state-
ments made by the accused to any prospective government witnesses. The
decision turned upon a close reading of rule 16 and the Jencks Act. After
December 1, 1975, Feinberg will be of limited applicability. Under
amended rule 16 ,the defendant will be entitled to discover the substance of
oral statements he or she made in response to interrogation by a government
agent, before or after arrest, if at the time of the statement the accused knew
he or she was speaking to a government agent.69 Presumably Feinberg will
63. The Conference report declared:
A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective
administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the defend-
ant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses before trial.
Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at influencing
their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this
policy.
H.R. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975).
64. United States v. Krilich, 502 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 992 (1975).
65. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
66. id. at 131.
67. 502 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
68. 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975).
69. FED. R. Cuim. P. 16(a)(1)A, as amended effective December 1, 1975. See
17 ChuM. L. RPTR. at 3216.
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remain the law as to oral conversations with undercover agents and with
private citizens.
Severance
For reasons of judicial efficiency, the Seventh Circuit, like other
reviewing courts, demands "most cogent reasons" for severance of properly
joined counts or defendants. 70 A recent case demonstrates that the court
adheres to this declared principle and has made reversals for failure to sever,
in its own language, almost "non-existent." ' 71
In United States v. Barrett72 the defendant was charged with two
schemes which had nothing in common except (a) voting machines and (b)
a violation of the public trust for financial gain. 73  Barrett allegedly shared
secretly in premiums paid to insure county voting machines. He did this at
a time when as Cook County Clerk he played a significant role in the county's
awarding of the insurance contracts. The conflict-of-interest arrangement
allegedly dated back to 1961. The case undoubtedly was based upon books
and records and upon the testimony of county and business associates of
Barrett whose word he did not seriously challenge. The defenses were legal
rather than factual: the arrangement did not constitute mail fraud. 74
In the second scheme Barrett allegedly received bribes from 1967
through 1971 in connection with the purchase of new voting machines.
Barrett strongly attacked the credibility of the key government witness, belief
in whom the Government conceded was essential to a conviction. 75
The proof as to the two schemes did not overlap, save for the testimony
of one minor witness. Thus there was almost no administrative convenience
in holding a joint trial except to the extent that joinder of any two charges
70. United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corporation, 507 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir.
1974).
71. United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1106 (7th Cir. 1975). Most cases
involve severance of defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 949 (1975) (impeachment of co-defendant through
use of his prior convictions held inadequate for severance); United States v. English,
501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 (1975) (redaction of confes-
sion to read "with two other persons" sufficient to avoid severance despite Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir.
1974) (joint trial of twenty-four co-defendants approved; rejection of attack on joinder
of substantive count with perjury count, the court following United States v. Pacente,
503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974) (en banc)).
72. 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1975).
73. There were also tax counts, but these apparently charged evasion of taxes only
as to funds collected in the bribery scheme. The majority did not suggest that the tax
counts constituted a rationale for denying severance.
74. The Seventh Circuit in Barrett rejected claims that either a loss to the county
or active concealment by the defendant was necessary for a mail fraud conviction in
a conflict-of-interest case. 505 F.2d at 1103-05.
75. The concession came in closing argument at trial. The witness had received
settlement of a very large civil tax liability in return for his testimony. 505 F.2d at
1100.
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is administratively convenient because only one trial, with one judge and one
jury, need be held.
The dissent, another most thoughtful opinion of Judge John Paul
Stevens, points out the prejudice. 76  It shows how the factual strength of the
insurance case painted Barrett as a greedy man and thus reinforced a bribery
case which could not be called overwhelming.
Nevertheless, the majority upheld the denial of severance. Referring
to the fact that both cases involved a violation of public trust, the panel, with-
out detailed analysis of either administrative convenience or the alleged
prejudice, simply declared: "Reversal of a conviction for failure to sever
under Rule 14 is almost non-existent. '77 Given the breadth of permissible
joinder under rule 8, the court seems to be saying that the Government can
join almost any federal offenses without fear of reversal if the district court
denies severance. 78  Once a court refuses to balance administrative con-
venience against possible prejudice-which is what rules of joinder and sever-
ance are all about-such indeed is the state of the law.79
Effective Assistance of Counsel
Once upon a time, a long time ago, probably in a far off place, some
now forgotten judge, in refusing to reverse a conviction because of defense
counsel's alleged incompetency, engaged in bits of hyperbole, which somehow
became black-letter law in many jurisdictions. In effect he stated that the
type of representation which the Bill of Rights solemnly guarantees an
accused is that which is a little better than a "sham or a farce," so as not
to be the equivalent of "no representation at all."80  During the past year
the Seventh Circuit utilized a state case on habeas corpus review to announce
a new standard and to banish the professionally embarrassing language from
the law.8' Under United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey,8 2 the test is
76. This may be an appropriate place to note the consistent high quality of the
criminal procedure opinions of Judge Stevens. If these opinions are typical, Judge Ste-
vens must be ranked among the very best of the country's reviewing court justices.
77. 505 F.2d at 1106.
78. A high-ranking federal prosecutor commented after reading Barrett that federal
severance rules are much more favorable to prosecutors than state rules. Guaranteed
anonymity, he noted that the federal rule seems to be, "What do you mean you need
two trials? It's the same defendant, isn't it?"
79. The dissent rests primarily upon misjoinder under rule 8 rather than denial of
discretionary severance under rule 14. However, it seems to construe the rules together
in a less mechanical fashion than does the majority, with the end of effectuating the
basic purposes of joinder and severance rules.
80. The author has not paused to search for the original source of the "sham or
farce" test. See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDuRE. 61-62 (4th ed. 1974) and authorities cited therein. Many courts, of course,
have rejected the old test. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1974). But see Bucci v. State, 17 CRiM. L. RPTR. 2482 (Ind. Aug. 18, 1975).
81. The court bypassed at least one opportunity to announce the new standard in
the context of reviewing a federal decision. See United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d
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whether defense counsel "meets a minimal standard of professional represen-
tation."
Critical, of course, is the administration of any standard and not the
rhetoric. Williams involved a late appointment, inexperienced defense coun-
sel, and a rather thin showing of prejudice. s3  The case may not be of great
precedential value because, at least in the view of a concurring judge and in
the author's view, the decision gave justice to a habeas corpus petition where
the issue was not strictly one of incompetency of counsel. Under Illinois law
an incarcerated defendant, absent a waiver, has a right to be tried within 120
days of arrest. If he agrees to a continuance, the 120-day term begins anew
from the agreed upon date. Sometimes, as in Williams, indictment, arraign-
ment and the appointment of counsel are delayed until very late in the term,
leaving the accused with a choice of postponing his statutory right to trial for
120 days or going to trial with an unprepared lawyer.8 4 Williams chose to go
to trial within the original 120 days. Against the background of this dilemma
Judge Wyzanski deemed counsel incompetent on a record which otherwise,
for want of prejudice, might not have supported reversal.85 Even in Illinois,
894 (7th Cir. 1974). Dicta in subsequent cases adopt the same new standard for use
in reviewing federal convictions. See Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975). In rejecting
a claim that a heavy case load makes a defense attorney per se incompetent, the
Matthews decision spoke of the new standard as if no dichotomy exists in the applicable
standard depending upon whether counsel is appointed or retained.
82. 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
83. Years after conviction Williams claimed that a certain person whom defense
counsel should have contacted would have vindicated him. This person came forward
years later to say that it was he who had broken into the store. How this would have
aided Williams is not apparent. Persons who looted buildings during the April, 1968
civil disturbances (during which this incident occurred) were guilty of burglary under
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1 (1967). Apparently Williams was caught at the store
in possession of goods. See People v. Williams, 116 Ill. App. 418, 253 N.E.2d 903(1969); People v. Williams, 5 Ill. App. 2d 56, 58, 282 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1972) (evi-
dence characterized as overwhelming). The witness who would have vindicated Wil-
liams was at the time of the trial (a) under indictment as a co-defendant of Williams
and (b) incompetent to stand trial. 510 F.2d at 637. Another claim of prejudice,
which even Judge Wyzanski rejected, related to four mysterious "alibi" witnesses whom
Williams could never identify with any sort of specificity. 510 F.2d at 639-40. Finally
petitioner claimed that he had not been told that his prior convictions could be used
to impeach him if he testified. The Seventh Circuit makes no reference to the evidence,
does not cite the Illinois opinions in this case, and by implication erroneously suggests
that the competency-of-counsel issue was never considered by Illinois reviewing courts.
84. Given the staggering number of indictments following incidents of April, 1968,
perhaps the delayed arraignment in Williams is understandable. Nevertheless the late
appointment-speedy trial choice has faced too many Cook County defendants. See Peo-
ple v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 402, 320 N.E.2d 849 (1974) (a different Williams); People
v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 38, 257 N.E.2d 3 (1970); People v. Lewis, 60 111. 2d 153, 330
N.E.2d 857 (1975); People v. Lee, 27 Ill. App. 3d 712, 327 N.E.2d 574 (1975). All
Illinois decisions have denied relief to those who chose to go to trial without "breaking
the term."
85. See note 83 supra.
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as to arrests after July 1, 1976, the dilemma should not appear again. Act-
ing on the suggestion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the legislature
apparently has solved the problem.8 6 A defense continuance ordinarily will
merely toll the statute rather than causing the 120-day period to run anew.8 7
The other Seventh Circuit reversal based upon ineffective assistance also
followed from a late appointment. Counsel in United States v. Miller88 was
appointed two days before trial. The next day the accused sought and was
denied a continuance. Rejecting a Government argument (which apparently
was based upon facts not appearing in the appellate record), the court held
that counsel need not prepare for trial before formal appointment, even if
he anticipates that appointment, especially where the prospective client is
incarcerated in another jurisdiction.8 9
Perhaps the most important effective representation rules fashioned by
the Seventh Circuit this past year came in the area of conflict-of-interests.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mandell90 refused to require a district
judge to admonish defendants of the dangers of multiple representation when
they appear before the court represented by a single retained attorney.
Carefully reviewing the policy considerations and the division among federal
opinions, the court held that, at least until it observes indicia of conflict, the
trial court should leave to defense counsel the recognition of conflicts and
the adherence to ethical standards.9 1
In Mandell the court also said that it would not reverse in joint-represen-
tation cases when the record shows the mere possibility of a conflict, however
remote. Instead, a conflict must appear "with a reasonable degree of
specificity."' 92  Only then is a showing of prejudice unnecessary to merit
reversal under Glasser v. United States.
93
Jury Instructions and Deliberations
United States v. Lawson94 held that a trial judge need not define for
the jury the meaning of "reasonable doubt" even when a party has tendered
86. See People v. Lewis, 60 Ill. 2d 153, 158, 330 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1975).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (1975) (as amended).
88. 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
89. It seems strange that neither Williams nor Miller cites the most recent impor-
tant "tardy appointment" decision of the United States Supreme Court, Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Miller relies on much older Supreme Court precedents.
Williams cites no authority at all, except the Seventh Circuit decisions which it over-
ruled.
90. 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975). Another conflict case involving cross-
examination by a lawyer of his former client was decided as a companion case. See
United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
91. 525 F.2d at 677. Appropriate action includes (a) refusal to enter into rep-
resentation, (b) withdrawal from a conflict situation, or (c) warnings to the client
where the conflict is one for which disclosure is sufficient remedial action.
92. Id.
93. 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
94. 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1446 (1975).
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a fair instruction on that subject. Apart from that issue, which the court said
was of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, few significant jury instruction
cases were decided this past year. 95 Of course, earlier the article discussed
the new policy on eye-witness identification instruction.96 The appendix also
notes substantive law cases which include instruction issues, including the new
Seventh Circuit instruction concerning insanity.97
The Seventh Circuit decisions on jury deliberations were of little
moment this past year. One noted that a trial judge has discretion to honor
a jury's request to have portions of trial testimony read back.98 That same
decision nevertheless affirmed in a case where a judge, in denying such a re-
quest, had declared that such a practice was impermissible.99 The court
also affirmed a district judge who, upon request, played for the jury a tape
of the instructions. 100 On the other hand, the court affirmed a judge who,
during evening hours, responded to a request for a rereading of instructions
by a message, sent through the marshall, telling the jury to keep deliberat-
ing.10 1
Guilty Pleas, Sentencing and Parole
The topics of guilty pleas and of sentencing are interrelated because of
the requirement that an accused be admonished of the penal consequences
of his plea. Frequent changes and increased complexity in sentencing struc-
tures make it difficult to comply with rule 11 requirements even in negotiated
plea cases where the sentence is far short of the maximum. The "costs" of
change and the value of administrative simplicity are of little concern to penal
reformers of whatever philosophical persuasion.10 2 Without discussion here,
95. In United States v. Demopoulos, 506 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 991 (1975), the court suggested that an "informer" instruction was unnecessary
in cases where a witness testifies under a grant of immunity, absent some other indica-
tion of informer status. In United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1974)
the court reminded district judges that not every statement or admission of the defendant
constitutes a confession, so that the word "confession" should not be used inappropri-
ately in jury instructions.
96. See text at note 8 supra.
97. The insanity decision is United States v. Sennett, 505 F.2d 774 (7th Cir.
1974).
98. United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1975). Cf. United States v.
Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975), holding it was not error to permit counsel to read
from transcript during closing argument. Both McCoy and Kuta reject arguments that
use of transcripts singles out that portion of the testimony for undue emphasis.
99. The reviewing court assumed that the district judge knew he had discretion de-
spite his facile statement to the jury that he was without authority. Cf. People v. Queen,
56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166 (1974) (reversing under nearly identical circumstances).
100. United States v. Braverman, 522 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1975). Jurors were also
permitted to take notes during the playing of the tape.
101. United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975).
102. This is as true in state systems as it is under federal law. After the Unified
Code of Corrections, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1000 et seq. (1973), became effective
on January 1, 1973, dozens of questions appeared, many related to transition from the
old law to the new. Even the most conscientious trial judges had no assurance that their
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the author refers readers to Gates v. United States10 3 as an example of the
lengthy legal analysis necessary to determine the possible penalties before
admonishing a defendant on a plea.
Ironically, except in rare instances, the required admonitions are in
terms of the statutory penalties without regard -to the realities of parole eligi-
bility.'0 4 Thus it is left to the lawyer to explain what the time imposed will
really mean. Garofola v. Benson'0 5 demonstrates that sometimes even the
statutory provision for parole eligibility will be deceptive. In sentencing for
most federal crimes, the court has the option of making the defendant eligible
for immediate parole consideration instead of requiring service of one-third
of a determinate sentence.' 0 6 As it turns out, as a matter of policy, the Board
of Parole rarely gave serious consideration to the parole possibility when it
first reviewed the case of a person shortly after he arrived at the institution
under an "immediately eligible" sentence. Instead, the Board "set" the
matter over to a date which frequently fell after the one-third point in the
sentence. On the other hand, a prisoner who had not received special con-
sideration from the district judge received full consideration of his parole
request at the completion of one-third of his sentence. The Seventh Circuit
opinion in Garafola, together with administrative changes referred to therein,
prompted by litigation, has ended this anomaly, assuming good-faith
compliance.
Another guilty plea-sentencing issue arises after a defendant success-
fully attacks a negotiated plea. United States v. Anderson'0 7 permits the
prosecutor to reinstate the greater charge where the plea had been to a lesser
included offense. Without necessarily reaching the important general issue,
admonitions as to sentence possibilities were adequate. A book could be written on the
Illinois experience. The author's review of the situation led him to the conclusions that
(a) simplicity is an important value and (b) every statutory sentencing change, includ-
ing those as to parole eligibility, should include a provision specifying that it does not
apply to offenses committed before the effective date of the act. Efforts to treat
"equally" those whose crimes were committed earlier just are too complex. Let the par-
doning authority handle the worst cases of injustice, as it did quite well following the
mitigation of drug penalties in Illinois in 1971.
103. 515 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975). The case involves the "no parole" provisions
of certain narcotic statutes, amended by Congress, interpreted by the Supreme Court,
and amended again, all between the date of the offense and the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion.
104. The exceptions include cases where no parole is possible. See Gates v. United
States, 515 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975). In most circuits they also include cases where a
"special parole term" is to be applied. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 305 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975). In other cases the nuances of parole eligibil-
ity need not be explained by the court. See Kemp v. Snow, 464 F.2d 579, 580-81 (10th
Cir. 1972).
105. 505 F.2d 1212 (7thCir. 1974).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970).
107. 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
on the peculiar facts of the case, the trial judge in Anderson nevertheless was
forbidden to impose a higher sentence than that originally imposed.108
On the other hand, in United States v. Turner,10 9 where a judge had
improperly sentenced an accused to consecutive terms, he was not thereafter
permitted to increase the original sentences, even though this would have
effectuated both his intent and the understanding of the parties as to how
much time the defendants would receive.
Finally, two rule 11 decisions not involving sentencing questions should
be mentioned. A district judge need not refuse a guilty plea where there
is a basis in fact, even if the defendant denies his guilt and insists that testi-
mony against him would be false. 01 Neither must he have the accused recite
his understanding of the elements of the offense."'
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
The Holding and the Dicta of Williams v. Brantley
In United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 1 2 the Seventh Circuit
directed that district judges look at the realities of the Illinois post-conviction
system in determining whether a petitioner has available state remedies. A
federal judge must not dismiss for failure to exhaust absent "direct precedent"
indicating that waiver doctrines will not bar relief in state court."l 3
Chief Judge Swygert added a suggestion for the Supreme Court of
Illinois. His dictum, reduced to simplest terms, is that in the administration
of the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act," 4 traditional waiver concepts
should be replaced by the federal habeas corpus "deliberate bypass"
standard. 1 5
108. See generally Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal from a Plea Bargain Con-
viction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. Rr~v. 663 (1973); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Reindicting Successful Plea Bargain Appellant on the Original Higher
Charges, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 258 (1974). Some language in Anderson could be read to
apply North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), to all resentencing including cases
where a negotiated plea has been vacated.
109. 518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975). The holding assumes that the original term was
not below the statutory minimum so as to be void.
110. United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1975).
111. United States v. Madrigal, 518 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1975).
112. 502 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1974).
113. Id. at 1386.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 et seq. (1973).
115. 502 F.2d at 1386. The decision also seems to criticize the Illinois res judicata
doctrine, discussed in the text at note 125 infra. However, the Seventh Circuit's sugges-
tion that Illinois reach the merits of any federal constitutional claim which the federal
courts would adjudicate on the merits does not mean that the Illinois courts should re-
view the same issue twice. Once the state reviewing court system has finally rejected
the merits of a claim, a federal court must consider the merits of the constitutional
claim. See Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974); Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S.
40 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1974).
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Finally, Williams strongly urges that district judges more frequently
appoint counsel for the indigent state prisoner who has filed a federal habeas
corpus petition." 6
The Journeys of George Williams and of Other
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners
George Williams was tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook
County.117 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court
of Illinois denied leave to appeal. 118 Some time later Williams desired to
raise new claims which he had not raised on appeal but which appeared on
the face of the record. 1 9 A well established Illinois post-conviction waiver
principle barred state relief. 120
Accordingly Williams filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The
district judge, without appointing counsel for the indigent petitioner, dis-
missed the petition for failure to exhaust available state remedies. Two more
federal petitions received the same treatment. Williams then took the federal
court's advice and filed a state petition. After appointing counsel and hear-
ing argument, the state judge ruled that claims appearing on the face of the
record could not be raised for the first time in a post-conviction petition
following affirmance of the conviction on direct review. Williams did not
appeal this decision because it was manifestly in accord with Illinois law.
Williams returned to the federal district court. In his fourth federal pro
se petition he was careful to point out that Illinois waiver rules precluded re-
lief as to issues "of record" once his direct appeal was lost. The district judge,
without appointing counsel, dismissed for failure to exhaust available state
remedies. On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed, in accordance with the
holding stated above, and directed the district court to reach the merits of
petitioner's claims.
The treatment Williams had received in federal court before the August,
1974, Seventh Circuit decision was typical of that accorded Illinois prisoners,
at least in the Northern District of Illinois. In the first place, counsel was
rarely appointed for the indigent pro se petitioner. For instance, in one nine-
month period during 1971, counsel was not appointed for any of the 121
indigent state prisoners who filed habeas corpus petitions.' 2'
116. 502 F.2d at 1387-88.
117. The history of this case is gathered from the Seventh Circuit opinion, the Illi-
nois opinion cited therein, and the original papers in both state and federal courts.
118. People v. Williams, 75 Ill. App. 2d 342, 221 N.E.2d 28, petition for leave to
appeal denied, 35 Ill. 2d 630 (1966).
119. These issues, purportedly of constitutional dimensions, concerned such matters
as the sufficiency of the indictment and the legality of the sentence.
120. See text at note 133 infra.
121. These figures and others utilized herein are taken from an unpublished study
conducted by Mariann Twist and Catherine Ryan (then law students, now Assistant
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Secondly, a high percentage of cases were dismissed for failure to
exhaust available state remedies. Many of the dismissals were erroneous
because Illinois doctrines of waiver or res judicata barred state relief. With-
out counsel, the petitioners rarely appealed the federal dismissal but instead
followed the erroneous directions of the federal judge and returned to state
court.12 2  There counsel would be appointed, as a matter of right, both in
the trial court and on appeal. The state courts would duly note that state
relief was barred by res judicata or waiver principles. Quite frequently the
federal courts would not see the matter again, the prisoner now having
completed the sentence.
From January 1, 1969, through August of 1974, only four Illinois State
Penitentiary inmates finally attained new trials through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings initiated in the Northern District of Illinois. These four, although
indigent, had the benefit of counsel, but their attorneys had not been
appointed by the district court. 123  Only on rare occasions did the district
court conduct an evidentiary hearing. 24  The system was, to say the least,
efficient from the viewpoint of federal administration.
Illinois Res Judicata and Waiver Principles
Res Judicata
Before Williams v. Brantley, federal district judges were able to dispose
of state petitions quickly if they were willing to overlook the realities of
Illinois res judicata and waiver principles. They would send prisoners back
on a fruitless journey through the state courts.
The Illinois res judicata rule in question is extremely simple. It was
enunciated in 1950 in the first case arising under the Post Conviction Act. 25
Cook County State's Attorneys) under the author's supervision. With the aid of a dis-
trict court clerk who handles in forma pauperis proceedings, every habeas corpus file
over a nine-month period was carefully reviewed.
122. Non-quantified assertions are based upon the author's experience as a director
of a prison post-conviction assistance program which served about 450 inmates at the
Illinois State Penitentiary (Stateville and Joliet Branches) and at the Dwight Reforma-
tory from 1969 to early 1972.
123. These figures were derived through consultation with Assistant Illinois Attor-
ney General James Zagel. The unit he headed throughout this period represented the re-
spondents in every case where an Illinois Penitentiary inmate filed a federal petition in
the Northern District of Illinois. The author has checked Zagel's figures against his own
compilation. The success figures exclude cases brought by jail inmates and juvenile de-
tainees. These also exclude two cases where the Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial but
was reversed by the Supreme Court, and two where the circuit reversed district judges
who had granted relief. They also exclude cases where only a sentence (e.g. the death
penalty) was vacated.
124. Again the source is Mr. Zagel. Even where relief was granted, it was on the
basis of the state trial record or, in one case, on the basis of the record of the Illinois
post-conviction hearing.
125. People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950).
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If a reviewing court has rejected a claim on the merits, a trial judge shall
not thereafter grant relief based on the same claim. The one significant ex-
ception permits relief because of an intervening change of law. The rule and
the exception precisely parallel doctrines utilized in handling post-conviction
claims of federal prisoners whose arguments have already been rejected by
a reviewing court.' 26
Nevertheless, some federal judges, in dismissing for failure to exhaust,
implicitly and sometimes expressly, told state prisoners to renew in the state
trial court claims which had already been adjudicated on the merits. It is diffi-
cult to say how often this occurred. When Judge Hubert Will in 1971 wrote an
opinion127 condemning the practice, however, many persons treated it as a
ground-breaking precedent. The Williams opinion, in fact, cites it as author-
ity for the new "realistic" view the Seventh Circuit was taking of Illinois
law.128
Waiver
More so than res judicata principles, Illinois waiver rules were
frequently ignored by the district judges in dismissing for failure to exhaust
"available" state remedies. These rules are also quite simple. Like the
Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act itself, which was originally drafted by
a committee appointed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 129 these waiver rules
embody a notion that every litigant, at all times aided by counsel, should have
one full and fair opportunity to raise a claim.'130 In the interest of efficient
administration, and to avoid piecemeal litigation, issues not raised when the
opportunity is available are thereafter deemed waived.
The first rule is that a claim not raised at trial is waived not only for
appellate purposes but also for post-conviction purposes.' 81 The notion is
that if waiver principles were abandoned once the case reached the post-con-
viction stage, there would be no point in invoking a waiver principle on direct
appeal. Every state and federal court, dozens of times each year, approves
and utilizes the waiver rule on direct review.13 2
126. See People v. Strader, 38 Il. 2d 93, 230 N.E.2d 569 (1967). Cf. Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
127. United States ex rel. Gates v. Twomey, 325 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. II. 1971).
128. 503 F.2d at 1385, 1387.
129. See Jenner, The Post Conviction Hearings Act, 9 F.R.D. 347 (1950).
130. Id. at 360.
131. People v. Somerville, 42 111. 2d 1, 13, 245 N.E.2d 461, 468 (1969).
132. See United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975) for an example
of the strict invocation of waiver. A lawyer refused to examine an important witness
on the mistaken notion that a conflict-of-interest prevented him from examining that
witness. He was deemed to have waived the defendant's right to confront and cross-
examine even though it was the lawyer who made the decision obviously for reasons
which meant nothing to the defendant. Of course both state and federal courts do have
plain error exceptions. In the Illinois post-conviction context, "plain error" goes under
the name "fundamental fairness."
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Secondly, where a defendant does not raise on direct appeal an issue
which appears on the face of the record, he cannot raise the issue in a post-
conviction attack, subject to a narrow fundamental-fairness exception. 1 3
Finally, where a post-conviction litigant fails to raise a claim in his first
original or amended post-conviction petition, he cannot thereafter file a
second petition to raise that claim. Because he has been guaranteed the right
to competent counsel in post-conviction proceedings, both at trial and on
appeal, he is required to bring all his claims at once. This rule is statutory,
not court-created.' 3 4
The three rules are not difficult to understand. George Williams
correctly stated them in his federal pro se petitions.'8 5 Nor are they inde-
fensible. The United States Supreme Court has deemed it proper for states
to utilize waiver rules in criminal cases and quite recently has noted the legiti-
mate state interests in avoiding piecemeal post-conviction litigation.18 6 Yet
-these waiver rules are the ones the Seventh Circuit said the Illinois high court
should abandon.
The Federal Deliberate Bypass Rule
The Williams opinion urges the Supreme Court of Illinois to utilize the
"deliberate bypass" rule in place of traditional waiver concepts in interpreting
the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act. That standard was first enunciated
in 1963 in Fay v. Noia1 7 as a test in federal habeas corpus cases for deter-
mining when a state prisoner had waived his right to raise a constitutional
claim.
No one can agree on what "deliberate bypass" means. Some opinions
suggest that unless a state prisoner personally participated in the decision not
to raise his claim in state court, he is not precluded from raising the claim
133. For instance, a petitioner can raise a claim of incompetency of counsel for the
first time in a post-conviction petition if he was represented at trial and on appeal by
the same attorney appointed to represent him in the post-conviction litigation where he
raises that allegation. Cf. People v. Smith, 37 111. 2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-3 (1973). Again a change in the law or incom-
petent representation on the first petition would allow a second petition.
135. On his final federal petition, in response to the form question about why he
had not appealed the Illinois dismissal, he correctly summarized Illinois law. The fact
that he had filed three federal petitions before returning to state court indicates he un-
derstood the Illinois waiver rules all along. The author's interviews with inmates and
those conducted by his students and his fellow lawyers in the program mentioned in note
122 supra, left the belief that Illinois inmates had no difficulty understanding Illinois
waiver rules. What they could not understand were federal district court orders inform-
ing them that they did have available state remedies. As bad as the federal run around
was in the cases of George Williams and John Adams, (see note 25 supra), there were
inmates who were treated worse by federal district judges. One who was clearly without
a state remedy spent over a decade trying to get a federal district judge to reach the
merits of his claim.
136. See Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), discussed in text at note 164 infra.
See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
137. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
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in a federal petition.13 8  Others, including one 1973 Seventh Circuit decision,
have said that ordinarily a lawyer's failure to raise an issue will constitute
a deliberate bypass. 13 9 Some courts, including the court in Williams, will not
find deliberate bypass unless there had been some possible tactical reason not
to raise the issue in state court.' 40 Others argue that a strategic decision not
to raise a claim is not essential. 141 As discussed below, the most recent
Supreme Court decision seems to have narrowed the concept in a fashion
which the Seventh Circuit in Williams ignored despite an earlier Seventh Cir-
cuit opinion which took note of the recent change. 142
Whatever else is true, it is safe to say that under the deliberate bypass
test a defendant will less often be deemed to have forfeited his right to raise
a claim. Phrased another way, piecemeal post-trial litigation will be toler-
ated more often under the deliberate bypass rule.
Reasons Offered for an Illinois Adoption
of Deliberate Bypass
The Seventh Circuit offers several reasons in support of its suggestion
that Illinois adopt the deliberate bypass test. Remarkably, despite the
vigorous nature of its criticism of the Supreme Court of Illinois,' 43 the Seventh
138. See, e.g., Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1965). This interpreta-
tion is based upon language in Fay which equates deliberate bypass with an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. 372 U.S. at 439. The Fay court also said, "A choice
made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief."
372 U.S. at 439 (emphasis supplied).
139. United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973). See
text at note 173 infra.
140. "A claim will not be deemed waived for purposes of federal habeas corpus re-
lief in the absence of a deliberately tactical decision to forego such claim." 502 F.2d
at 1386-87.
141. Petitioner in Fay himself deliberately chose not to appeal, fearful of receiving
a more severe punishment on retrial. Hence it is difficult to understand how a "delib-
erately tactical decision" can be the key because Fay was held not to have deliberately
bypassed state remedies.
142. See text at note 164 infra.
143. The criticism of the state high court is sharp. The supreme court is told that
it has emasculated the Post Conviction Act. The Seventh Circuit says that it should
be clear that the circuit does not approve. However, if the state high court follows the
path outlined by the circuit, the circuit "would welcome an opportunity to declare the
Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act a generally effective remedy." 502 F.2d at 1387.
It was the Supreme Court of Illinois which fashioned the act in 1948 and which
breathed new life into it in the mid-1960's by setting standards for appointed counsel.
See Jenner, The Post Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347 (1950); People v. Smith,
37 ll. 2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169 (1967); People v. Slaughter, 39 IM. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d
566 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 651 (Supreme Court Rule 651) (1973). See
also People v. Eatmon, 47 Ill. 2d 90, 264 N.E.2d 194 (1970) (absolute right to trial
transcript.)
By contrast, before Williams, the Seventh Circuit did very little for either state or
federal prisoners pursuing post-conviction remedies. It certainly did not encourage the
appointment of counsel. See text at note 121 supra. The difference between effective
post-conviction remedies and ineffective ones, in the author's view, is the availability of
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Circuit did not argue for the inherent superiority of the deliberate bypass test.
It did not even pause to recognize the debate between proponents of
the two approaches, ,the one arguing against strict waiver rules, the other
affirmatively encouraging a unified system of post-trial review. 144  Accord-
ingly, this article does not enter that dispute. Instead the author examines
the pragmatic considerations which the Seventh Circuit offered in support of
its suggestion to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Confusion of Prisoners
Chief Judge Swygert suggested that the ,Illinois waiver rules are confus-
ing.145  As previously noted, this simply is not true.' 46 For example, as the
Seventh Circuit itself acknowledged, where a direct appeal has been lost,
ordinarily an issue appearing on the face of the record cannot thereafter be
raised in a post-conviction petition.' 47 Either res judicata or waiver will bar
relief. The Post Conviction Act is not to be used as a second appeal
for matters of record. If that is an "emasculation" of the Act, as the Seventh
Circuit suggests, 48 it is still an interpretation that can be understood.
On the other hand, "deliberate bypass" is not a readily understandable
concept. 149  The carefully written 1973 Seventh Circuit opinion in United
States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey' 50 sharply varies from the 1974 Williams
counsel. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. Not until lawyers got involved
in federal habeas corpus litigation did Williams come about. It took attorneys to dem-
onstrate to the Seventh Circuit when Illinois remedies are available and when they are
not. The marked increase in successful petitions in the Northern District of Illinois
since Williams, at least in part, may be attributed to the increased participation by coun-
sel.
144. The split is reflected in the difference between the A.B.A. standards and the
recommendations of the National Advisory Commission. The former favors a kind of
deliberate bypass standard. The latter would require that ordinarily all issues to be
raised after trial in a single unified post-conviction proceeding. See COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS WrrH STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 554-583 (1974). A leading critic of Fay v. Noia and of
the A.B.A. approach is Judge Henry Friendly. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 157-60 (1970). The
most respected academician currently in the field favors the unified approach. See gen-
erally D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS; ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORM
(1973).
145. 502 F.2d at 1387.
146. See note 135 supra.
147. 502 F.2d at 1387. See text following note 125 and text at note 133 supra.
148. 502 F.2d at 1385. The waiver doctrine does narrow the use of the Act. Be-
fore free transcripts were available, the Act was necessary to provide an indigent full
review of trial errors of constitutional dimension. After 1956 free transcripts were
awarded (and, in Illinois, counsel appointed) for direct appeal. Then the Act no longer
had to serve as a substitute for direct appeal. Elimination of this use of the Act was
hardly a sinister action.
149. See text beginning at note 138 supra.
150. 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973).
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opinion on the subject. It surely would be no guidance to tell state prisoners
to file in state court unless the Supreme Court of Illinois would find a "delib-
erate bypass." Additionally, discarding a rule which has been the subject
matter of twenty-five years of interpretation, in favor of one the Illinois courts
have never used, would add no certainty.
Tension from Federal Release of State Prisoners 'Based
Upon Claims Deemed Waived by the State Courts
The Williams opinion maintains that federal judges may sometimes be
required to grant relief to state prisoners whose claims have never been
treated on the merits by state courts. This, it says, is a result of the differ-
ence between deliberate bypass and waiver. The solution, the court says,
is for Illinois to adopt the deliberate bypass test. The solution would end
state-federal tension.' 5 '
There is no empirical evidence to support the view that state judges are
offended by the federal release of state prisoners whose claims the state
judges have deemed waived. In the Northern District of Illinois, before Wil-
liams, that rarely happened, primarily because Northern District judges
so often sent state prisoners back on futile journeys through the state court
if the Illinois courts had not considered the issue on the merits.' 5 2 The only
instances in which judges of the Northern District of Illinois granted Illinois
State Penitentiary inmates new trials from January 1, 1969, through August,
1974, involved cases where the state reviewing courts had already rejected
on the merits the federal claim.153 This kind of phenomenon has caused ten-
sion elsewhere, if not in Illinois. 54 However, in habeas corpus cases, federal
judges have the duty to consider questions of law without any special defer-
ence to the prior state decision. 155 Any tension is a result of United States
Supreme Court decisions not now under discussion. 156 -It is important to note
that if state courts and federal courts had identical waiver rules-as Williams
suggests-in absolutely every case where a district judge granted habeas cor-
pus relief he would be "reversing" a decision of a state appellate tribunal
which had rejected on the merits petitioner's claim.
Assume that the two standards remain different and that federal judges
do release a state prisoner whose claim was deemed waived in state court.
151. 502 F.2d at 1387.
152. See text at note 122 supra.
153. The author refers to the eight cases where habeas corpus relief was granted,
including the four where a higher court later reversed new trial awards. See note 123
supra.
154. Here the reference is to the now-famous reaction by the National Conference
of Chief Justices following Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
155. The district judge "may not defer to" the state court's "findings of law. It is
the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings
independently." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
156. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963).
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Assume further that some state judge is offended. A federal solution that sug-
gests that the state judiciary solve the "problem" by entertaining in piecemeal
fashion post-conviction claims heretofore deemed waived will not soothe
tensions. Such a judge would suggest that the problem would be better
solved by a federal rejection of the deliberate bypass concept in favor of
traditional waiver rules.
The Federal Caseload
The Williams opinion says that through use of traditional waiver rules
the Supreme Court of Illinois has "forced" post-conviction litigation into fed-
eral courts. 157 This is a curious view of efforts to administer an efficient sys-
tem which gives every litigant one full and fair opportunity to pursue a claim.
The truth is that the United States Supreme Court has pulled post-con-
viction litigation into federal courts. It has done so (a) by permitting state
prisoners to use federal habeas as another tier of review, and (b) by limiting
findings of waiver through the adoption of the deliberate bypass rule.
For a long while, by misapplying exhaustion requirements, some federal
courts avoided the impact of the United States Supreme Court decisions.158
Laudably the Williams court has said, "No more." Realizing what faithful
adherence to Fay v. Noia could mean, however, the Williams opinion pro-
poses a new solution to the problem: state courts, instead of federal courts,
should entertain the belated claims of state prisoners. This should be done
in the name of easing federal-state tensions.' 59
The Williams proposal is fundamentally inconsistent with the underlying
rationale of Fay v. Noia. Fay did not hold that the states could not, or
should not, apply traditional waiver rules to preclude relief in state courts
based upon belated federal claims. On the contrary, implicit in Fay is the
recognition that the states have sufficient state interest in judicial economy
to preserve their own waiver rules even where federal rights are involved. 160
Instead, the Fay Court noted that since the only rights at stake in federal
habeas corpus proceedings are federal rights, the federal courts have a special
interest in resolving those claims.161 Accordingly, a state determination of
waiver would not bar federal relief. Instead, the federal courts would dis-
pense with traditional waiver rules and expend the effort in reviewing belated
federal claims unless the respondent could meet the stiff burden of showing
that the petitioner had deliberately bypassed an earlier opportunity to raise
his claim. 16 2
157. 502 F.2d at 1387.
158. See text at note 122 supra.
159. 502 F.2d at 1387.
160. 372 U.S. at 431. See also the cases cited in note 136 supra.
161. 372 U.S. at 431.
162. 372 U.S. at 438-39.
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The Future of the Controversy
There are already signs that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in accord with
the suggestions of well-respected authority, is moving toward a more compact
system of post-trial review rather than adopting the piecemeal approach
which follows from an easing of waiver rules. 163 There is no indication that
the court will soon replace traditional waiver rules with the federal deliber-
ate-bypass test.
What is more interesting is a phenomenon that Williams completely
overlooked: an apparent federal movement to reject the deliberate bypass
test in favor of traditional waiver rules.
Without purporting to reject the deliberate bypass standard the Supreme
Court in Murch v. Mottram'64 cast serious doubt upon its vitality. The peti-
tioner had been convicted in a Maine trial court. On appeal he failed to
raise a claim concerning the composition of the jury although it was an issue
which appeared on the face of the record. Later in a state post-conviction
proceeding he raised this issue and some others relating to parole revocation.
His counsel then advised the trial court that petitioner was withdrawing all
but his claim concerning the revocation proceedings. The trial judge indi-
cated that he felt that if the prisoner proceeded on only one claim he would
waive the right to raise other issues in a second post-conviction proceeding.
Counsel disagreed. After discussing the matter with his client, counsel
announced he was withdrawing the other claims. Later when a second peti-
tion raised the jury claim the Maine Supreme Court held it had been waived
by the failure to include it on appeal or in the first post-conviction proceed-
ing.
After holding a four-day hearing to determine whether a deliberate by-
pass had occurred (a fact which did not escape the Supreme Court's atten-
tion), a district judge dismissed a federal habeas corpus petition upon a
determination that the respondent had met its burden. The Court of Appeals
reversed and granted relief on the basis of facts appearing in the original trial
record. It noted that the defendant could not be said to have intentionally
relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege.16 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the conviction. Commenting on Maine waiver rules, which are strik-
163. Effective July 1, 1975, the court amended its rules to require that a defendant
who seeks to attack a guilty plea must take prompt action, so that the trial court can
immediately vacate the plea if necessary. Prompt appellate review of such a claim
rather than a belated post-conviction petition is also encouraged. Again the right to
counsel is absolute, and again waiver will result from failure to take prompt action. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 605 (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605) (1975). Strict
enforcement of this rule will end belated state-court post conviction attacks on guilty
pleas.
164. 409 U.S.41 (1972).
165. The case history is taken from the Supreme Court opinion and from the earlier
decisions cited therein.
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ingly similar to those of Illinois, the Court noted that the state has a valid
interest in orderly procedures and declared that a defendant has no constitu-
tional right to piecemeal review in the face of such valid state rules." 6 Ig-
noring the intentional relinquishment language of Fay, the Court noted that
the petitioner may not have intended to waive his right to present his jury
claim. 167 It then observed:
But if a subjective determination not to waive or abandon a
claim were sufficient to preclude a finding of a deliberate bypass
of orderly state procedures, constitutionally valid procedural re-
quirements, such as those contained in the Maine system requiring
the joinder of all bases for attack in one proceeding, would be
utterly meaningless.' 68
The theme that a strictly applied deliberate bypass standard in federal
habeas corpus matters undermines orderly rules of waiver was renewed in
Davis v. United States.' 69 There a federal prisoner had sought relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Supreme Court in Kaufman v. United States1'7 0 had
already held that the deliberate bypass standard of Fay must be utilized in
evaluating federal prisoners' constitutional claims. In Davis, however, the
"deliberate bypass" test which had been adhered to in Kaufman was itself
seriously undermined. The Court observed that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(2) requires that challenges to an indictment be made
before trial or not at all, absent a showing of good cause. It deemed it
"inconceivable" that the more liberal requirement of waiver in federal habeas
corpus matters should be permitted to "perversely negate" the rule's purpose
in requiring that challenges ordinarily be made before trial.1'71 Application
of the deliberate bypass standard in collateral proceedings would permit a
defendant to "flout" reasonable time limits and would remove "incentive" for
complying with their terms. 172
It is surely a short step from Davis to an overruling of Fay. If failure
to comply with time limits of a federal rule can be the basis of a finding of
waiver in a collateral attack, then failure to comply with a state rule-
whether embodied in case decisions, statutes, or court rules-should ordinar-
ily be sufficient. The Seventh Circuit opinion in United States ex rel. Alhum
166. There can be no doubt that States may provide, as Maine has done, that
a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all known constitutional
claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of Appeals agreed that the
statutory scheme was 'orderly procedure of the state courts,' as that term is
used in Fay v. Noia . . . . No prisoner has a right either under the Federal
Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to insist upon piecemeal collateral at-
tack on a presumptively valid criminal conviction in the face of such a statu-
tory provision.
409 U.S. at 45-46.
167. 409 U.S. at 46.
168. ld.
169. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
170. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
171. 411 U.S. at 242.
172. 411 U.S. at 241.
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v. Twomey, 1 73 which preceded the Williams opinion by one year, recognized
this when it reinterpreted the deliberate bypass test in light of Davis. It
declared that generally a failure by counsel to raise a claim at trial or on
appeal will bar habeas corpus relief. 174  The result in Allum is very much
akin to the waiver rule and the "fundamental fairness" exception now utilized
in Illinois.
The Williams opinion ignores the A lum opinion's careful redefinition
of deliberate bypass. Accordingly, it may not be fair to say that the Seventh
Circuit is moving toward utilization of the Illinois rule. However, if the
author were to speculate based on Davis, he would guess that, whatever the
Seventh Circuit does, the United States Supreme Court will very shortly over-
rule the Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass test in favor of a rule that says that
claims not raised in a timely fashion at trial or on appeal may not be raised
in habeas corpus cases absent unusual circumstances. In short, the United
States Supreme Court will adopt the Illinois test before the Supreme Court
of Illinois accepts the Seventh Circuit's gratuitous advice by adopting the Fay
standard for use in Illinois post-conviction proceedings. 17 5
CONCLUSION
The harsh criticism, in the section on federal habeas corpus, of
the views expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Williams should not over-
shadow the deserved recognition of what the court did in that decision. It
ended federal treatment of state prisoners which was often in law contrary
to Fay v. Noia and in fact quite heartless. The court finally accepted,
although not graciously, an added burden for the federal judiciary.
Nor should dictum in a single opinion overshadow the rest of the year's
work. Particularly in the area of police practices, the court's opinions were,
with rare exception, of high quality.
Any criticism must be placed in the proper context, with due recognition
of the caseload pressures and of the time and effort necessary to keep up
with developments even in the single field of criminal procedure.
173. 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973).
174. 484 F.2d at 744-45.
175. Another possibility, of course, is that the Supreme Court will end the use of
habeas corpus as a means of reviewing state convictions, at least in cases where the con-
stitutional claim is unrelated to the integrity of the fact-finding process. Two grants
of certiorari in June, 1975, suggest such a possibility. See Wolff v. Rice, 513 F.2d 1280(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975) and Stone v. Powell, 507 F.2d 93 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975).
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APPENDIX--CRIMES AND DEFENSES
Among the Seventh Circuit opinions for the year ending August 15, 1975, those
cited below treat important substantive criminal law issues. The author has not at-
tempted to summarize the holdings of these decisions.* Instead, descriptive phrases
have been supplied to indicate the particular focus of each opinion.
CRIMES
Assault: United States v. Bell, 505 F.2d 539 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964
(1975) (elements of offense).
Civil Rights: United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bryant, 516 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bradbury, 518 F.2d
498 (7th Cir. 1975) (elections).
Conspiracy: United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974) (doctrine of
merger); United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975) (one conspiracy or
two).
Contempt: In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975) (direct); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975)
(indirect).
Drugs: United States v. Waller, 503 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1974) (constructive trans-
fer); United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005
(1975); Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975) (recidivist provisions);
United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107
(1975) (controlled substance schedules); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (importation); United States v. Moser,
509 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1975) (indictment, variance); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d
1062 (7th Cir. 1975) (violation by physician); United States v. DiNovo, No. 74-1681
(7th Cir., July 7, 1975) (constructive possession, control).
Dyer Act: United States v. Shanks, 521 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975) (transportation
of vehicle parts).
Firearms: United States v. Kowalski, 502 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 979 (1975) ("business of dealing," vagueness challenge); United States v. Hor-
ton, 503 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974) (receiving weapons in commerce); United States v.
Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1683 (1975) (false statements at pur-
chase, commerce element); United States v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1975)
(false statements at purchase, effect of Illinois pardon).
Gambling: United States v. Capetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (federal juris-
diction under 18 U.S.C. § 1955).
Hobbs Act:** United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975), vacating
in part 502 F.2d 875 (1974); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975) (effect on commerce);
United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Braasch, 505
F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975) (color
of right).
Mail Fraud: United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), vacated in
part 517 F.2d 73 (1975); Strauss v. United States, 516 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1975) (mail-
ing); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1975) (public official conflict
of interest; loss).
Mann Act: United States v. Snow, 507 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Prater, 518 F.2d 817 (1975) (intent).
Murder: United States v. Brown, 518 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1975) (premeditation).
Perjury: United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1974) (hedged re-
sponses; variance; defenses of entrapment and duress); United States v. Demopoulos,
506 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975) (materiality).
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Selective Service: United States v. Bush, 509 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1975) (conscienti-
ous objection); Burke v. United States, 509 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1975) (physical condi-
tion).
Tax: United States v. Liskowski, 504 F.2d 1268 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Martin, 507 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 482 (7th
Cir. 1975), vacating 511 F.2d 477 (1974) (wilfulness); United States v. Jordan, 508
F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment defense); United States v. McMullen, 516
F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1975) (withholding laws; liability for corporate conduct); United
States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1975) (bank deposit theory).
DEFENSES
United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1974) (duress); United States
v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1157 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975) (entrapment);
United States v. Sennett, 505 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974) (insanity).
* See note 2 supra.
** See note 2 supra.
